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Abstract
This article focuses on discussion concerning moral psychology and
moral education from the philosophy of science standpoint. The
theoretical model of Lakatos' program in the field of the philosophy of
science is introduced and the structure of moral psychology and moral
education is analyzed and evaluated by using Lakatos' scientific
research program as a theoretical framework. The article begins with a
review of the theoretical background of the philosophy of science, then
continues by analyzing and evaluating the structure of moral
psychology by using a theoretical framework from the philosophy of
science, and then considers the case of moral education. The authors
conclude with a brief description of significant directions for the
introduction of the natural sciences, such as neuroscience and
sociobiology, into moral psychology and moral education.
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With the development of the natural sciences, issues related
to them have increased since a couple of centuries ago;
philosophical debates about the natural sciences also have
steadily increased. Thus, the philosophy of science, a discipline
that deals with the philosophical problems of science, started to
become an integral part of mainstream philosophy. Several
disciplines, such as social science, that contain the word "science"
in their names but are not classified into the category of the
natural sciences, also started to become subjects of
philosophical-from the viewpoint of the philosophy of
science-consideration (Henrickson & McKelvey, 2002). For
example, psychology as a scientific discipline in the realm of
social science became a field of philosophical consideration.
There are some theoretical controversies over whether
psychology is a part of science or not; recently, however, it has
now settled into a scientific status (Stein, 1994). In fact, these
days, the philosophy of science is interested in philosophical
issues specific to particular kinds of science; psychology is also
an issue of concern of the philosophy of science (Wilson, 2005).
Several issues related to psychology, such as the rationality of
human beings, the malleability of human nature, and innate
knowledge and ideas have begun to become subjects of
philosophical study (Bermudez, 2005; Mason et al., 2008).
The development of neuroscience also has thrown many
philosophical problems into modern psychology. The eliminative
materialism and naturalization of philosophy, the natural
scientific explanation of consciousness, and the location of
cognitive function from the results of neuroimaging have started
to come under philosophical debate (Bennett & Hacker, 2003).
Since contemporary moral psychology has started to introduce
theoretical ideas from neuroscience, philosophical issues related
to neuroscience should be considered an issue of modern moral
psychology; the philosophy of neuroscience seems to be helpful
in establishing the proper relationship between existing moral
psychology and flourishing studies in neurobiology.
Consequently, philosophical approaches to psychology would
help to enhance our understanding of the nature and structure
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of psychology: especially, models and tools of the philosophy of
science would be useful, because they could work as a
framework for analyzing and interpreting theories and research
in psychology. In fact, existing theories of the philosophy of
science have coped with problems such as how a theory works,
can be explained, and is confirmed {Kuipers, 2007J. These kinds
of viewpoints would also be helpful to understand the nature
and structure of moral psychology systematically.
In this paper, we address concerns of moral psychology and
mora! education from the philosophy of science standpoint. We
place particular emphasis on Lakatos' scientific research program
as a theoretical framework for analyzing and evaluating the
structure of moral psychology and moral education. We then
discuss significant directions for the introduction of the natural
sciences, such as neuroscience and sociobiology, to moral
psychology and 11101"£11 education.
IT. Philosophy of science and the research program
Basically, the term "philosophy of science" is the name given
to that branch of philosophy that reflects on and critically
analyzes science; it tries to understand the aims and methods of
science, along with its principles, practices, and achievements
(Salmon, 1999). Since this study focuses On the structure of
moral psychology with the help of concepts from the philosophy
of science, this study will review some parts of the philosophy
of science that deal with the structural aspects of natural science.
In the field of the philosophy of science, Lakatos would be
a representative philosopher who systcmaticaily studies the
nature of scientific research. Within a' historicalpel"spective,
Popper with his "naive falsification" goes beyond mductivism,
whereas Lakatos goes beyond Popper by suggesting that "one
learns not by accepting or rejecting one single theory but by
comparing one research program with C\110ther for theoretical,
empirical and heuristic progress" (Lakatos! 1974: 320). In fact,
Lakatos' program. emphasizes the concept of "a series of theories"
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instead of "a theory," which is the basic concept from the logic
of discovery. In terms of the components of Lakatos' research
program, there are four connected components embedded in
Lakatos' program: the hard-core (HC) located in the core of the
program, the protective belt (PB) surrounding the HC, and the
negative heuristic (NH) and positive heuristic (PH), which are
both held in the PB (Lakatos, 1970). The HC is the core and
foundation of the theory, and it possesses firm and unchangeable
features that are very difficult to attack and degenerate in the
program; the PB is composed of auxiliary hypotheses for
preventing the HC from being attacked; the NH and PH are
both strategies embedded in the PB with separate functions to
forbid rebuttals and to expand theory. In Lakatos' own words
(Lakatos, 1970: 135): "The negative heuristic specifies the hard
core which is irrefutable by the methodological discussion of
protagonists; the positive heuristic consists of the partially
articulated set of suggestions of hints on how to change, develop
the refutable variant of research program, how to modify,
sophisticate the refutable protective belt."
Lakatos' idea (1999) was conceived from many historical
stories of science; he took some of the major theories in physics,
like Newton's, Maxwell's, Einstein's, and the quantum theory. He
explained that those theories are terribly complicated and
growing (not static) entities; they are growing entities with a
fixed hard core but an ever-increasing protective belt and
mathematical techniques. used for problem solving. Moreover,
Lakatos suggested that the model of a research program could
be applied even to the social sciences. In fact, as Lakatos
introduced, there was a philosopher who studied a research
program of social science; Latsis (1972) analyzes a neoclassical
(research) program of situational determinism following Lakatos'
model: it consists of a hard core (Profit maximization, Perfect
knowledge, Independence of decision and Perfect market),
protective belt (such as 'slack' in decision making), and a
positive heuristic (puzzle-solving mechanism).
From the model of Lakatos' scientific research program, we
may get several implications about moral psychology and moral
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education; in fact, as the era of consilience is now corning, many
disciplines that were previously out of the range of moral
psychology and moral education are now being rapidly
introduced to moral psychology and its educational application,
such as neuroscience and sociobiology; thus, the forms of moral
psychology and moral education also seem to be changed. In
this situation, Lakatos' model would be helpful to understand
and establish the proper structure of moral psychology and its
relation with moral education, and give us implications about
what moral psychology and moral education should do for their
improvement. In the next section, this study will analyze the
structure of moral psychology with the help of ideas in Lakatos'
research program model.
III. Research program of moral psychology
There are many definitions of the term "moral psychology"
which have been suggested by many scholars who study within
the field. First of all, Lapsley (1996) refers to the term as the
study of model development; moreover, some scholars such as
Doris and Stich (2006) insisted that moral psychology investigates
human functioning in moral contexts, and asks how these results
may impact debate in ethical theory; in addition, they tend to
use the term more broadly with an interdisciplinary aspect that
includes any topics at the intersection of ethics, psychology and
even the philosophy of the mind.
A. Hard cores of moral psychology
From those definitions of the term of "moral psychology,"
we may get several notions that moral psychology deals with
the developmental and functional aspects of human processes
that are related to morality. In our view, the following three
parts can be considered as the hard cores of moral psychology.
First, we may be convinced that in moral psychology, the
development of human morality has been one of the main
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tenets; it seems to be convincing that scholars in moral
psychology tend to study developmental changes in human
morality. Especially, the developmental aspect of moral
psychology would be firmly established by Jean Piaget; Piaget
(1931, 1955, 1960) said that one's intelligence progresses from a
state in which one accommodates to the environment and that
the main idea was adapting to the world through assimilation
and accommodation. Moreover, he insisted that a young child
starts to realize that moral rules are cooperative arrangements
among equals, agreed upon for mutual benefits, and his/her
view point of morality is developed from heteronomous morality
to autonomous morality (Rest, 1979); these parts of Piaget's
model would be the root of the trend of developmental morality
in the history of moral psychology.
This trend of the developmental process of morality in moral
psychology is being continued along the history of moral
psychology. Kohlberg also supported the idea of moral
development; he determined that the process of moral
development was principally concerned with justice, which
continued throughout the individual's lifetime, and could be
classified into six stages (Kohlberg, 1981, 1984). In fact, for this
structural development, Blatt suggested a mechanism of
development in which the cognitive stimulation of moral
discussion, that is, of children hearing themselves and others
argue at different stages of moral reasoning, ought to create
movement to the next stage for the children involved (Rest,
1994).
Scholars who significantly accede to Kohlberg's intellectual
tradition, neo-Kohlbergians represented by Rest,also proposed a
developmental perspective; although neo-Kohlbergians accepted
Kohlberg's theory that human morality is developed, they denied
Kohlberg's notion of Piaget's hard stages and suggested an
upward movement in terms of gradually shifting distributions of
the use of and preference for more developed moral thinking
(Rest et al., 1999). In short, a stream that is out of the direct
flow of Piaget-Kohlberg-Neo Kohlbergian is based upon a notion
of development that is shared by the flow of
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Piaget-Kohlberg-Neo Kohlbergian.
Second, every model of moral psychology tried to relate
their model to the actual moral behaviour of actors; moral
psychologists have tried to explain or forecast a person's moral
behaviour by following their model of human morality. In fact,
the problem of moral behaviour has a long history that can be
traced to the ancient Greeks, such as Socrates who explained the
relationship between knowledge and actual behaviour (Plato,
1986). Moreover, following Socrates, Aristotle (1996) tried to
explain moral behaviour that is nurtured by habitual moral
behaviour in his book, The Nichomachean Ethics; in this text, he
studied the relation between a human with virtues and whether
he/she behaves morally (Sahakian, 1974).
These days, similar to ancient times, the explanation of
human moral behaviour is an important problem in moral
psychology. Scholars who study people's moral character would
be people who representatively are interested in people's moral
behaviour. Lickona (1993) proposed three components of
morality: moral knowing, moral feeling, and moral behaviour; he
studied the problematic situation of the relationship between
moral judgment and feeling and effective moral behavior.
Moreover, Blasi (1995, 2005), another scholar who has been
interested in moral character, offers a model of moral identity
that provides us with a notion of moral behaviour. He explained
that if moral considerations are crucial to the essential self, then
self-integrity would hinge on whether one is self-consistent in
action.
Kohlberg, who initially seemed to consider the cognitive
factor in moral decision making as important, in fact, greatly
accounted for the actual behaviour of a moral actor. He also
stated the importance of the three different aspects of the
internalization of morality: the behavioral, emotional, and
judgmental aspects of moral action. Kohlberg (1992) proposed
that a behavioral criterion of internalization is that of intrinsically
motivated conformity, or resistance to temptation; it would be
related to the notion of moral character.
Rest's Four Component Model started with the question:
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How does moral behavior corne about? From this question, Rest
and his colleagues (Rest, 1986; Rest et al., 1999) suggested at
least four major internal component processes that lead to moral
behaviour: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation,
and moral character. The model represents processes involved in
a moral act, not general traits of people.
Third, the integration of various factors related to moral
bahaviour is also one of the main ideas of moral psychology;
moral psychologists have tried to integrate several factors that
affect human moral behaviour. Kohlberg is well known as a
moral psychologist who strongly insisted on the importance of
the cognitive factor. However, after encountering much empirical
evidence that showed the limits of a moral reasoning based
model, Kohlberg introduced a motivational factor into his model.
Thus he suggested the integration of judgment of a deontic
choice that is related to the question, "what is right," as seen in
his original model of moral reasoning, and the judgment of
responsibility to act on what one has judged to be right
(Kohlberg & Candee, 1984).
After Kohlberg, Neo-Kohlbergians proposed a more
complicated, integrated model of human morality. Rest suggested
that analyzing the production of moral behavior in terms of the
four component model is useful for explaining various failures in
moral behavior, and for planning moral education interventions
(Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This trend can be interpreted as a
continuous trial to introduce and integrate many factors other
than cognition as one psychological component that determines
moral behaviour.
Scholars who suggested the existence of a moral personality
also seriously consider the integration of factors to their model
of morality. For instance, Blasi (1995) showed the process of
moral integration; he strongly insisted on the integration of
morality and identity. It means that moral understanding
eventually acquires its own motivational power, moral
understanding begins to make its own specific claims and
becomes a part of one's motivational system, and one's moral
understanding and concerns become a part of one's sense of
UNDERSTANDING MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MORAL - 9
identity through the specific way one views and defines oneself.
We may understand this model as he strongly insisted on the
importance of the integration of understanding and other factors
related to motivation and identity to behave morally.
B. Positive heuristics of moral psychology
As already described, it seems to be that there are several
hard cores in a research program of moral psychology; scholars
in moral psychology note a developmental trend, try to explain
the actual relation between their model and moral behaviour,
and integrate multiple factors that are related to inducing moral
behaviour. From these hard cores, there are several positive
heuristics-protective belts that support the hard cores of moral
psychology; it includes experiments, observations and other
possible methodologies in the field of moral psychology. This
part copes with the challenges and refutations that come from
outside of the research program.
We may find that several experiments support each hard
core of the research program of moral psychology; they make
auxiliary hypotheses, provide a protective belt around the hard
cores, and cope with risky realities that are not compatible to
the existing hard cores or positive heuristics.
First, the developmental trend in moral psychology is based
on experimental results; accumulative experiments would
construct positive heuristics and a belt around the core of moral
psychology. Piaget used a "clinical interview" for his experiment
to confirm his model of moral development (Lickona, 1994); he
interviewed children to make positive heuristics around the core
of his model to protect it. After Piaget, because the Piagetian
model and its experimental evidence were basically limited to
children's moral development, Kohlberg and his colleagues tried
to establish a model of moral development that could be applied
to a whole lifetime. He conducted a 20-year longitudinal study
of moral development based on the Moral Judgment Interview
(MJI), and established moral development stages that can
strengthen the hard core of a developmental trend (Colby et al.,
1983). A few decades later, to deal with the criticism of
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Kohlberg's experiments and his ideas, such as criticism of the
strict, hard stages, Rest and his colleagues developed the
Defining Issues Test (DIT). By using this test, moral
developmental researchers have found that there is gradual
upward movement and an established strengthened model of
moral development to cope with criticism of an existing hard
core of moral psychology (Rest & Thoma, 1986). In short, a hard
core of moral psychology, a developmental trend, has coped
with many challenging anomalies for the existing core, by
adjusting and changing its positive heuristics instead of refuting
the hard core through the conducting of many experiments and
making of observations; as a result of those trials, though the
model of moral development is continuously changing, a hard
core of moral psychology, a developmental trend, is not refuted
or discarded by challenging evidence, but is preserved by a
change of its auxiliary belt.
Second, there also have been continuous changes of positive
heuristics around other hard cores; in fact, two rest hard cores,
the importance of moral action and the integration of elements,
seem to be interconnected. To explain actual moral behaviour,
scholars amended their positive heuristics of their model; in this
process, generally, scholars have integrated various factors that
can affect moral behaviour. To cope with the limits of the
explanation of moral behaviour with his model, Kohlberg
introduced and integrated the factors of deontic judgment and
responsibility judgment (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984). Rest and his
colleagues tried to introduce the utilizer dimension as a mediator
variable to improve the explainability of the existing model (Rest,
1986). In one part of the experiment, Thoma (1994) developed
the Ll-Score based on the DIT methodology of Rest, to improve
between the former judgment model and action relationship; his
trial is an adjustment of the protective belt, not a discarding of
the hard core, in an attempt to respond to outside criticism.
Moreover, as mentioned above, many scholars incorporate an
integration of factors to improve the relationship between their
existing model and actual moral action; this kind of trial can be
understood as an adjustment of the positive heuristics-protective
UNDERSTANDING MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MORAL - 11
belt around their models. Thoma (1994) insisted that the four
component model of Rest and his colleagues offers very clear
direction for research on moral actions. Moreover, scholars in
character education also integrated many factors into their
models of morality to cope with external problems; for instance,
there is Blasi (2005)'s integration of willpower, will and integrity.
N. Moral education and research program of moral
psychology-with consideration on the relationship
between the research program and introduction of
natural science
Basically, moral education or character education in schools
is rooted in researches on moral psychology. For instance, Nucci
(2006) said that most of the developmental research of moral
education have roots in the work of Kohlberg and his
colleagues, and these days, the trend of moral education has
started to attend to the diversity and heterogeneity of lived
moral systems. He also stated that educational research includes
work related to the integration of affective climate and classroom
social interactions that can foster interpersonal morality and basic
human decency (Lapsley, 2006; Nucci, 2006).
Although it seems that there are extensive differences among
the suggestions of moral education scholars, in our view, the
core idea of the scholars matches with the hard core of the
research program; a developmental trend, emphasizing actual
moral behaviour and the integration of elements, would be
applied to moral education.
First, development is also important in moral education as
well as in moral psychology. In the general perception of
education, not only moral education, we can find that most
schools insist that developmental trends and interventions are
necessary to induce development; Peters (1972) insisted that
education is connected to the development of qualities and that
it includes several interventions toward students; Oakeshott
(1972) argued that education is a transaction occurring between
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the generations, not a natural process or accommodation to
circumstances, and by learning, students are "becoming human";
Dearden (1972) commented that education is a process of
growth, so stimulation should be provided to the student to
induce the growth; and determinism cannot be applied to
education, because it denies the potentialities of change, and
insists the student's ability is fixed at birth and then unalterable.
Therefore, without the developmental basis of moral
education, there would be no chance to change human morality
and the trials of educational interventions to make people moral
would lose their value. In fact, moral educators steadily
emphasize development in human morality; Kohlberg (1966)
suggested that moral education should stimulate transition to
postconventional morality; Carr (2008) proposed character
education as the cultivation of virtue that came from Aristotle to
MacIntyre. Although there would be theoretical differences
among scholars, from cognitive trend to character education
trend, almost moral educators try to foster students' morality
through educational methodology.
Second, focusing on moral action also would be an
important theme of moral education as it would be for moral
psychology. Helping children pursue actual moral behaviour has
been the most important goal for all levels of moral education;
for instance, the purpose of Kohlberg's just community approach
to moral education is basically for the discussion of day-to-day
dilemmas and induces the development of moral judgment; thus,
it ultimately tries to support creating consistency between
judgment and action (Higgins, 1995).
In the traditional character educators' viewpoint, character
education's history has Aristotelian roots, and the pedagogical
implications are to create or "engrave on our essence" much like
carving a character into a piece of wood. "To do good is to
know good" is an overly simplistic summary. In line with its
Aristotelian tradition, the character approach focuses on action
and emphasizes making virtuous behaviors habitual (DeRoche &
Williams, 1998; Ryan & Bohlin, 1999). In addition, based on
Eisenberg's model, many character education programs focus on
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promoting pro-social behavior. Pro-social behavior is described as
"behavior intended to benefit another" (Eisenberg et al., 1999).
Such behaviors may include comforting, sharing, working or
playing cooperatively, and displaying empathy for others, all of
which have an element of altruism.
Lastly, moral educators have been interested in the
integration of several factors that are related to human morality;
many scholars or educators in moral education tried to establish
an integrative model of moral education. As mentioned earlier,
since moral education tries to induce students' moral behaviour
in actual situations, an integrative approach toward moral
education has been an important issue for scholars. For instance,
to cope with criticism on the former trend of cognitive moral
education, neo-Kohlbergians proposed moral education based on
the four component model; the application of the four
component model implies that all four processes of morality
need to be fostered, and it would mean an integrative
educational approach, not an approach to only one aspect of
morality (Bebeau et al., 1999). From another perspective,
Berkowitz (2002), a scholar in the school of character education,
suggested that teachers should provide children with
opportunities to practice good character, including building skills
such as perspective-taking, critical thinking, conflict resolution,
peer mediation, student self governance, and involvement in
charitable activities; in the program, the curricula most often
included lessons in several fields: social skills and awareness,
personal improvement/ self-management and awareness, and
problem-solving/decision-making (Berkowitz & Bier, 2004). In
addition, several scholars proposed the convergence of various
educational trends that include social and emotional learning
(SEL), moral education, and character education (Elias et al.,
2008).
We have reviewed theories and methodologies of moral
education and tried to find out the relations between them and
the hard cores of moral psychology; development in human
morality, the importance of pursuing moral action and a
convergent-integrative educational approach from various
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elements of human morality would be the main themes of moral
education. From this analysis, this study will discuss how to
cope with the new trend of moral psychology and moral
education, and the introduction of the natural sciences, such as
neuroscience and sociobiology.
First, several moral psychologists tried to introduce results in
natural science to moral psychology. One of the most recent and
representative trials was done by Narvaez; basically, Narvaez
and Vaydich (2008) insisted that moral psychology which
investigates human functioning in a moral context is affected by
new trends in technological advancement, especially
neuro-science. From such a viewpoint, Narvaez (2008) suggested
the "Triune Ethics" theory, which shows the possibility of the
relationship between multi-level morality and brain activation.
Moreover, Haidt (2007) proposed the introduction of evolutionary
theory; he suggested the four principles of "affective revolution,"
which are intuitive primacy, moral thinking for social doing, that
morality binds and builds, and that morality is about more than
harm and fairness; he also argued that those principles are
linked with evolutionary theory.
Second, there are other kinds of approaches that have
mainly been tried by natural scientists: the analysis of moral
psychology from the viewpoint of neuro-science or
sociobiology-evolutionary theory. In regard to neuro-science,
Casebeer and Churchland (2003) explained which parts of the
brain cope with moral problem solving; and Greene et al. (2001)
examined how emotions are engaged in moral judgment. Mainly,
they used Functional MRI (fMRI) to investigate the activation of
a human's brain when he/she deals with moral thinking or
emotion. Moreover, sociobiologists explained the origin of human
morality from evolutionary theory; Darwin (2006), the pioneer of
evolutionary theory, believed that instinctive sympathy and moral
sentiments are evolved behavioral dispositions that help ensure
the survival of the individual and the group to which the
individual belongs; for Darwin, morality is transmitted to
descendants through heredity, and moral tendencies could appear
as inborn virtues in the next generation (Darwin, 2006). Recently
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sociolobiologists who basically accede to Darwin's idea insisted
that altruistic behaviour has come from kin-selection (Wilson,
1978), the memory of an experience of being helped by others
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003), evolutionary robustness, stability and
initial viability (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), or indirect
reciprocity-exchanging meat-money to reputation-money (Hawkes,
1993).
Some of them insist that finally, human morality and its
psychology will be and should be explained in terms of scientific
knowledge; Wilson (1982, 1999) strongly insisted that
normative-moral decision making can be fully analyzed and
predicted by the natural sciences, and that moral development is
only a more complicated and less tractable version of the genetic
variance problem with his example that the Kohlbergian stage
model can be fully analyzed by sociobiology. However, from the
consideration of a research program of moral psychology and its
relation with moral education, Wilson and several sociobiologists'
radical idea of 'conscilience' does not seem to be convincing.
First, natural scientific ideas would pose a threat to the hard
core of development. In fact, some of them proposed the
possibility of change; for instance, some molecular biologists and
neurobiologists (e.g., Gallagher & Holland, 1994; Ledoux, 2002;
Rodrigues et al., 2004) have insisted on the plasticity of the
synaptic mechanism of the human circuit, which means that
conditioning or learning could affect, even on a molecular level,
the amygdala and other emotional circuits. Although they
propose the plasticity of the human brain, they do not provide
us with direction or a goal of development as moral
psychologists generally do; since the idea of development and
change in natural science is basically descriptive, it would not be
sufficient to set the goals and methodologies of moral education.
Second, pure natural science would not be enough to
explain moral action. Models of neurobiology and sociobiology
have tried to explain and predict human behaviour by scientific
methods. Thanks to the rapid development of technology, we
can understand some parts of the mechanism of decision making
and action. However, it does not fully explain human moral
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behaviour. Various philosophers have argued about the
limitations of natural science; Singer (1981) argues that even if
we have knowledge of human emotion and a mind that is
perfect enough to predict our decisions and behaviours, we are
capable of refuting the predictions and of acting differently.
Consequently, it seems to be that natural scientific knowledge is
not able to perfectly explain or predict what we "are going to"
do.
Finally, neural science and evolutionary theory can be
harmful to the integrative idea of moral psychology and
education. Basically, scholars who tried to explain human
morality in terms of natural science have a disposition of
reductionism; scientists have tried to explain abstract, conceptual
factors of human morality as concrete, materialistic-in reduced
manner-elements. However, this trend has received several
criticisms; some insisted that there is autonomy in every level of
theory, so it could not be fully reduced in terms of a theory at
the lower level (Okasha, 2002); others have argued that a
complex, dynamic system of a bio-organism cannot be fully
predicted by linear or ordinary mathematical models (AIm &
Arkin, 2003); practically, an extreme amount of equations and
explanations will be necessary when such a complex system is
greatly reduced (Van Regenmortel, 2004; AIm & Arkin, 2003).
Consequently, the non-conditional introduction of natural science
into moral psychology and moral education would cause severe
problems, such as a neglect of the complex architecture of
human morality and integrated factors of moral psychology; it
would critically violate the third hard core of a research
program of moral psychology.
V. Concluding thoughts
It seems to be that a direct, full-ranged introduction or
adoption of natural science to moral psychology or moral
education would not be helpful, but even harmful; the hard
cores of moral psychology and education would be threatened
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by the non-conditional introduction of natural science. We cannot
change existing theories of moral psychology to ideas of natural
science as Wilson insisted; it does not produce meaningful
results to improve moral education. Instead of an overall shift of
theory, it will be useful to adopt results of the natural sciences
to amend and increase the protective belt of moral psychology;
for instance, Haidt (2007)'s four principles of "affective
revolution" that came from an evolutionary basis can strengthen
moral theory that only consists of harm and fairness. His idea
can make up for the weak point of contemporary moral
psychology, increase the explanatory power of the theory, and
finally, contribute to positive heuristics; however, his idea does
not imply an overall theoretical shift-the refutation of the hard
cores-of existing moral psychology.
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